Based on the payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma in page 48-49 of the book, the point ("confess", "confess") is not an equilibrium.
At the point ("confess", "confess"), the payoff to any one player is -20, and hence, any one player has an incentive to switch to "not confess" so as to increase the payoff to -10.
At the point ("confess", "not confess") or ("not confess", "confess") , no one has an incentive to switch.
At the point ("not confess", "not confess"), any one player has an incentive to switch to "confess" so as to increase the payoff from -5 to -2.
In other words, there are two pure strategies equilibrium: ("confess", "not confess") and ("not confess", "confess").
Based on the payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma in page 48-49 of the book, the point ("confess", "confess") is not an equilibrium.
回覆刪除At the point ("confess", "confess"), the payoff to any one player is -20, and hence, any one player has an incentive to switch to "not confess" so as to increase the payoff to -10.
At the point ("confess", "not confess") or ("not confess", "confess") , no one has an incentive to switch.
At the point ("not confess", "not confess"), any one player has an incentive to switch to "confess" so as to increase the payoff from -5 to -2.
In other words, there are two pure strategies equilibrium: ("confess", "not confess") and ("not confess", "confess").